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This paper examines the terror management function of cooperative behaviour within a single-play Prisoner’s Dilemma 
(PD). Using 312 introductory psychology students, mortality salience significantly increased the cooperative behaviour of 
prosocial participants, while there was a non-significant difference in cooperative behaviour for individualistic and 
competitive participants. Changes in cooperative behaviour were not influenced by the ingroup or outgroup status of the 




     Charles Dickens’s story “A Christmas Carol” is a well-known fable, whose protagonist is a miser named Ebenezer 
Scrooge. Despite his substantial wealth, Scrooge is unhappy, ungenerous, and does not help people in need. In this story, 
Scrooge is visited by the ghosts of Christmas past and Christmas present. However, it is not until the ghost of Christmas yet-
to-come reminds Scrooge of his own mortality, and the legacy that he will leave behind, does Scrooge change his 
behaviour. As a consequence of having his mortality made salient to him, Scrooge changes his avaricious ways; giving 
money to orphans and the family of his long-suffering assistant Bob Cratchet. Dickens’ story is a foretelling of terror-
management theory (TMT) (Jonas, Schimel, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2002). 
     Terror-management theory (Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997) assumes that we manage our existential terror 
(which is created by our conscious recognition of our own mortality) by creating and putting our faith into a cultural 
worldview, and through the self-esteem that comes from living up to the standards of this worldview (Dechesne, Janssen, & 
van Knippenberg, 2000; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel, 2004). TMT suggests that these dual 
components of cultural worldview and self-esteem mitigate the effects of existential terror, and that reminders of one’s 
mortality lead to the need for these psychological structures. This is known as the mortality salience hypothesis 
(Pyszczynski et al., 2004) and has been the main paradigm of research within TMT. 
     Unfortunately, activating these defence mechanisms can lead to unsavoury effects such as ingroup favouritism, outgroup 
derogation, and dangerous behaviours. For example, mortality salience has resulted in harsher evaluations of people who 
transgress cultural norms and more favourable evaluations of people who comply with cultural norms (Florian & 
Mikulincer, 1997), rating people of their own faith more positively and people not of their faith less positively (Greenberg, 
Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Rosenblatt, 1990), having a greater nationalistic bias (Dechesne, Greenberg, Arndt, & Schimel, 
2000; Nelson, Moore, Olivetti, & Scott, 1997), and partaking in  risk-taking behaviour (Ben-Ari, Florian, & Mikulincer, 
1999; Hirschberger, Florian, Mikulincer, Goldenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2002). 
     However, there appears to be a silver lining in the effects of TMT on attitudes and behaviour. Using a subtle real-world 
reminder of mortality, Jonas et al. (2002) found that participants who were interviewed in front of a funeral home had more 
favourable attitudes towards charitable organisations, compared with the control group who were interviewed several blocks 
from the funeral home. Acknowledging the differences in self-report attitudes and actual benevolent behaviour, Jonas et al. 
(2002) extended upon this finding in a second study and examined whether prosocial behaviour was affected by the 
participants’ relationship to cultural institutions. Following mortality salience, Americans were significantly more likely to 
give greater donations to charities that supported American projects as compared with the control condition. The finding 
that people gave more money to charities that supported their ingroup was labelled the “Scrooge effect”.  
     The “Scrooge effect” suggests that there may be beneficial effects of TMT, which raises some important theoretical and 
empirical questions on the effects of TMT on behaviour.  TMT suggests that people will act consistently with their values 
and worldview when their mortality is made salient to them (Pyszczynski et al., 2004). If people have underlying values that 
are generous, helpful, altruistic, or prosocial we might expect that mortality salience would increase this tendency to 
produce prosocial behaviour. However, if people are selfish, individualistic, or competitive – which we could call “proself”, 
mortality salience may strengthen commitment to these values, thus producing more selfish less generous behaviour, the 
opposite of the Scrooge effect.  In Dickens’s “A Christmas Carol”, Scrooge was a miser and would have had proself values. 
As such, his generosity in response to mortalty salience may be at odds with TMT’s predictions. However, whether 
prosocial and proself individuals’ behaviour differs in response to mortality salience has not been examined. 
     A main aim of the present research was to investigate the behavioural effects of mortality salience on individuals who 
differ in their social value orientations. i.e., prosocial vs. proself. A key element of individual differences are social value 
orientations which can be regarded as stable preferences for the outcomes ourselves and others in social exchanges (Messick 
& McClintock, 1968). While there are numerous typologies of social value orientations, the literature has generally 
examined the differences among prosocial, individualistic, and competitive orientations (De Cremer & Van Lange, 2001; 
Van Lange, De Bruin, Otten, & Joireman, 1997).  
     Prosocials are concerned with maximising the joint outcome of the self and the others (i.e., cooperation) and minimising 
the difference in the outcomes for themselves and others (i.e., equality).  Individualists tend to maximise the outcomes for 
themselves with little or no regard for the outcome of others, and competitors are concerned about maximising their own 
outcomes relative to the outcomes of others (Van Lange, 1999).  
     Social value orientations develop from both nature (Rushton, 1986) and nurture, with substantial evidence suggesting 
that the theoretical and empirical findings on social value orientations are closely linked to the personal histories of social 
interaction, especially those with a primary caregiver in early childhood (Hazan & Shaver, 1987). Indeed, it has been argued 
that social value orientations are predictive of behaviour within different interdependent contexts that include the Prisoners’ 
Dilemma (PD) and other social dilemmas (Liebrand, 1984; Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994). The ecological validity of social 
value orientations extends to the willingness to sacrifice in close relationships, to donate money to charity and helping-
related behaviours (McClintock & Allison, 1989; Van Lange, Agnew, Harinck, & Steemers, 1997). 
     Indeed, it has been argued that values are ultimately culturally derived, and that while values serve other social functions 
they ultimately provide contingencies of self-worth that may be affected by reminders of mortality (Pyszczynski & Cox, 
2004). Recent research indicates that reminding people of their mortality can be a powerful moderator of the effect of values 
on behaviour (Pyszczynski et al., 2004). An initial goal of the present study was to determine if mortality salience affects 
the decision to cooperate for prosocial individuals differently to proself individuals within a social dilemma. 
     One of the most widely used and simplest social dilemmas in game theory is the PD (Kollock, 1998). In the PD, there are 
two actors and each actor is confronted with two choices, an individually-desirable choice or one that is based on collective 
interests. The mixed-motive structure of the PD and its many variants have been used as a paradigm to model dilemmas that 
arise within interdependent situations in economics, politics, evolution, and animal and human behaviour (Smit & 
Trigeorgis, 2004). 
     The original developers of the PD provided the analogy of two prisoners who are independently offered a deal to confess 
(defect) or not to confess (cooperate) against each other (Kollock, 1998). The outcomes of each choice are dependent on 
what the other will choose. For example, in Table 1, if Prisoner A confesses (defect) and Prisoner B does not confess 
(cooperate), then the Prisoner A will receive no penalty while Prisoner B will receive ten years in prison. If both prisoners 
confess (defect) against each other, they will both be charged for the crime and receive seven years each in prison, and if 
both do not confess (cooperate with each other) they will both be charged with a minor offence and a penalty of two years in 
prison.  
     For Prisoner A, confessing (defect) dominates not confessing (cooperate), because whatever the expectation of Prisoner 
B’s choice, Prisoner A’s dominant strategy is to confess and receive the smallest prison sentence. Since the same logic 
exists for Prisoner B, then it follows that the dominant strategy for both prisoners is to confess (defect) against each other, 
and in doing so both prisoners will receive an outcome that is collectively inferior (combined total of 14 years in prison) to 
what they would have received had they cooperated with each other and not confessed (combined total of 4 years in prison). 
Since the dominant strategy is to defect, then both actors are doomed to a socially inferior outcome of mutual defection.  
     It is surprising that no studies to date have investigated the affect of mortality salience on the decision to cooperate 
within an interdependent situation given the ubiquity of social dilemmas in everyday social exchanges and the constant 
reminders of the fragility of human life through sources such as the media. This article investigates individuals’ decisions to 
cooperate within a social dilemma when reminded of their own mortality. In doing this, particular attention is paid to 




The aim of this study was to investigate the dual components of worldview defence and self-esteem striving 
behaviour following mortality salience on the decision to cooperate in a PD. To explore this, individuals participated in the 
single-play PD conducted on the Internet with an ingroup or an outgroup member. TMT suggests that people will act 
consistently with their values when their mortality is made salient to them (Pyszczynski et al., 2004) and if people have 
underlying values that are prosocial then we might expect that mortality salience would increase this tendency to produce 
prosocial behaviour. Hypothesis 1 predicts that participants with prosocial values would increase cooperation towards others 
in the PD following mortality salience. However, if people are individualistic, or competitive – which we could call 
“proself”, mortality salience may strengthen commitment to these values. Hypothesis 2 predicts that participants’ 
individualistic or competitive values would reduce their cooperation towards others following mortality salience. It has been 
argued in the literature that similar others contribute to worldview defence, and hypothesis 3 predicts that cooperation for 
participants with prosocial values would increase towards ingroup members compared to outgroup members following 
mortality salience. It was further predicted in hypothesis 4 that cooperation for individualistic or competitive participants 






     This experiment was conducted on the Internet and involved a 2 (social value orientation: prosocial vs. proself) x 2 
(mortality salience vs. future aversive event) x 2 (outgroup vs. ingroup) between groups design.  The dependent variable 
was the proportion of cooperative choices made in the PD. To minimise systematic biases in this experiment, the mortality 
salience condition and group status of the other player was randomised within the testing session. 
 
Participants 
     This research was conducted using 312 introductory psychology students (248 female, 64 male; mean age = 20.6 years) 
from the University of Western Sydney (UWS), who received partial course credit for participation. Most of the participants 
(81.8 percent) were religious and 83.4 percent said “yes” or “maybe” to some form of afterlife.  
     Participants were informed that the PD game would be played for money where one participant would be chosen at 
random to be paid one third their cash winnings at the end of each testing session. All other participants played hypothetical 




Internet survey. A brief internet survey was given to participants which collected socio-demographic information, 
religion and participants’ level of identification with UWS and their affiliation with UWS students. 
Social value orientations questionnaire. Participants completed a written version of the nine-item Decomposed Games 
measure to assess their social value orientations. This instrument is internally consistent, temporally reliable, and not related 
to measures of social desirability or to mood. It also has good ecological validity in a number of domains (Van Lange, 
1999). Participants were classified as being prosocial, individualistic or competitive when they made six or more consistent 
choices (De Cremer & Van Lange, 2001).  
Comprehension test. Participants in the present study were given a test of their understanding of the PD.Comprehension 
of the PD has been used in previous studies to ensure that participants understand the games being played (Morris, Sim, & 
Girotto, 1998; Parks & Vu, 1994).  
Rosenberg’s self-esteem scale. Global self-esteem was assessed using the ten-item Rosenberg (1965) Self-Esteem Scale 
(RSE). This is a well-validated measure of global self-esteem with high test-retest correlations of greater than 0.80 (Kernis, 
Grannemann, & Barclay, 1989). The measure involves a 4-point response scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 4 
(strongly disagree). 
Mortality salience and control conditions. Participants in the mortality-salience condition answered two open-ended 
items on: “Please briefly describe the thoughts and emotions that the thought of your own death arouses in you” and “jot 
down, as specifically as you can, what you think will happen to you as you physically die and once you are physically 
dead.” To control for the possibility that the effect of this induction was explained by thinking of a future aversive event per 
se, rather than mortality, participants in the control condition were asked answer two parallel open-ended questions about 
future examinations at university (Greenberg et al., 1990).  
Positive and negative affect schedule (PANAS). The PANAS contains two subscales, positive and negative affect. Each 
subscale consists of 10 adjectives (e.g., irritable, scared, excited) with a 5-point response scale between 1 (very slightly or 
not at all) and 5 (extremely). A high positive affect score reflects a state of high energy, full concentration, and pleasurable 
engagement. In contrast, a high negative affect is a general dimension of subjective distress that correlates with aversive 
mood states such as stress. These ten-item scales for positive and negative affect are internally consistent and have good 
convergent and discriminant validity.  When used with short-term instructions (e.g. right now or today), they are sensitive to 
fluctuations in mood (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988).  
Webpage and online games. A webpage and an online computer game were constructed and used for the study. 
Handouts were also given to participants in the testing session and complemented the online instructions and 




     Each testing session contained a minimum of eight participants. To minimise artifacts within the testing session, the 
experimenter read from a transcript for each testing session. Upon arriving, participants were welcomed, given an 
information packet that contained all the testing materials (with the exception of Internet resources).  
     Particpants opened the information packet. After filling out a consent form, participants completed a brief demographic 
Internet survey. Upon completion of the brief questionnaire participants then completed the Social Value Orientations 
measure. Next, the PD was explained and a comprehension task tested participants’ knowledge of the PD.  
     Participants were told that they would be playing the PD over the Internet,  with either students in the current testing 
session (their ingroup) or students from Tokyo National University  (their outgroup). Tokyo National University was chosen 
because Japan was one hour behind Australia and has a relatively high Internet penetration compared to other countries of 
similar time differences. In reality, participants only played with UWS students. 
     Participants completed the RSE scale, the mortality salience induction (or control), and the PANAS scale while being 
told they were waiting for the Japanese students in Tokyo to log onto the Internet. Self-esteem was measured before the 
mortality-salience induction because previous research has demonstrated that self-esteem moderates the effects of mortality 
salience (Halloran & Kashima, 2004; Harmon-Jones, Simon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1997). To ensure that mortality 
salience did not influence the positive and negative affect of participants, PANAS was administered after the mortality 
salience induction. 
     The PANAS had the additional purpose of increasing the time between the mortality–salience manipulation and 
completion of the PD task, as mortality–salience are usually strongest after a brief delay (Pyszczynski et al., 2004). 
Following administration of the PANAS, the online game was explained in detail and online comprehension tests were 
conducted on the Internet.  
     Participants were then told that Japanese students had logged onto the Internet and participants were given the password 
to log onto the server that was hosting the PD. After logging onto the computer, the server assigned identification numbers. 
These numbers were randomly distributed between 1 and 30, and participants were told that numbers 1-15 were playing a 
UWS student and that 16-30 were playing a Japanese student. Consistent with previous studies, throughout the testing 
session, at no time were the words “cooperate” or “compete” used in the game play. Choices for games were identified as 
either “left” or “right”, “top” or “bottom”, rather than cooperate or defect. At all times, the terms “social dilemma” or 
“prisoner’s dilemma” were replaced with the term “game”. Participants then completed the single-play PD.  
     At the end of the testing session participants were fully debriefed. 
 
Results 
     Participants were classified as having a value orientation of prosocial, individualistic, or competitive if they made six or 
more choices corresponding to one of these values types in the social value orientation measure (Van Lange, De Bruin et al., 
1997). Of the 312 participants, 68 (21.8%) were classified as individualistic, 72 (23.1%) as competitive, and 98 (31.4%) as 
prosocial. The remaining 74 (23.7%) did not meet the criterion and were excluded from further analysis.   
     There were no gender differences in the likelihood of being classified as prosocial, competitive, or individualistic χ2 (2, 
N = 228) = 0.698, p = 0.705. Thus the data for men and women are combined in the analyses. One person failed in the 
comprehension test for the PD and was not included in this analysis. Independent sample t-tests were conducted on self-
esteem and mood between the control and mortality salience conditions to ensure that both groups had similar levels of self-
esteem prior to mortality salience and similar positive and negative affect between groups following mortality salience. No 
significant differences were found between both groups. Prior to the analysis, participants who were born in Japan or had a 
negative association towards UWS in comparison to Tokyo National University were omitted from the analysis. Usable data 
was provided by 203 participants for this analysis.  
     A four-way frequency analysis was performed to assess the relationship between decision (cooperate vs. not cooperate), 
status of the group (ingroup vs. outgroup), social value orientation (prosocial vs. proself), and the mortality salience 
condition (mortality salience vs. control). All cells in the analysis met the assumption of having expected and actual cell 
frequencies in excess of five (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). After the model was selected, there were no outliers in the 16 
cells.  
     Tests of partial correlations for all possible effects produced a significant interaction between decision and status of 
group played against, partial χ2 (1, N = 203) = 3.985, p = 0.046; a significant interaction between decision and social value 
orientation, partial χ2 (1, N = 203) = 18.189, p < 0.001; and a significant three-way interaction between the decision by 
social value orientation by mortality salience, partial χ2 (1, N = 203) = 4.714, p = 0.030. Using backward elimination, the 
best fitting model was found to be the three-way interaction of decision in the PD by social value orientation by mortality 
salience, which had a likelihood ratio χ2 (8, N = 203) = 9.39, p  = 0.310. According to (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001) this 
indicates a good fit between observed frequencies and expected frequencies generated by the model. 
     Referring to Table 2 the decision to cooperate increased from 38.3 percent to 70.3 percent for prosocial participants 
following mortality salience. To investigate this three-way interaction, a 2 (cooperate vs. not cooperate) x 2 (mortality 
salience vs. control group) chi-square analysis was performed, separately for prosocial and for proself participants, using a 
Bonferroni adjusted α of 0.025. A significant relationship existed between the decision to cooperate and mortality salience 
for prosocial participants, chi square χ2 (1, N = 84) = 8.67, p = 0.003. Thus prosocial participants were significantly more 
likely to cooperate in the PD following mortality salience, and hypothesis 1 was supported. 
     There was no significant association between the decision to cooperate and mortality salience for proself participants, χ2 
(1, N = 119) = 0.34, p = 0.560. This can be seen in the frequencies reported in Table 2, where the decision to cooperate for 
proself participants was not significantly affected by mortality salience. Thus hypothesis 2 was not supported. 
     As mentioned previously, the four-way interaction yielded a non-significant result, χ2 (1, N = 203) = 0.210, p = 0.647 
and the best-fit model was a three-way interaction that did not involve the status of the group (ingroup or outgroup) that was 
played against. Thus it follows that hypothesis 3 and 4, which hypothesised that ingroup and outgroup status would affect 
the cooperation rates of prosocial and proself participants, are not supported in this analysis. However, it is important to 
note that a trend in the results did exist for proself participants. For example, following mortality salience, proself 
participants reduced their cooperation rates toward ingroups from 35.5 percent to 23.3 percent, a similar figure to the low 
and relatively unchanged cooperation rates observed for proself participants towards outgroups in both the mortality salient 
and future aversive event condition. 
 
Discussion 
      
     The results of the experiment support hypothesis 1, with prosocial participants making significantly more cooperative 
choices following mortality salience. No significant differences in cooperative behaviour were found for proself 
participants, so hypothesis 2 is not supported. Cooperation was not significantly different towards ingroup or outgroup 
members for prosocial and prosocial participants and thus hypothesis 3 and 4 were not supported.  
     This experiment supports the hypothesis that social value orientations have a moderating effect on cooperative behaviour 
within a social dilemma following mortality salience. Prosocial participants were significantly more cooperative towards 
others (both ingroup and outgroup members) following mortality salience, yet there was no significant difference in the 
cooperation rates for proself participants. This research provided evidence that mortality salience affected another type of 
human behaviour, in this case cooperative behaviour and contributes to the growing evidence of the behavioural effects of 
mortality salience (Pyszczynski et al., 2004).  
     The results expand on current research by emphasising that within interdependent situations terror management can 
impact positively on cooperative human behaviour. This study contrasts with most other studies that have shown that 
mortality salience increases prejudice (Greenberg et al., 1990), derogation of outgroups (Greenberg, Simon, Pyszczynski, & 
Solomon, 1992), and materialistic pursuits within Western societies (Kasser & Sheldon, 2000). In contrast to prior research, 
this study has shown that mortality salience increases cooperative behaviour for prosocial individuals and that the ingroup 
or outgroup status of the partners did not have an affect on these increased cooperation levels. It is unlikely that this finding 
is due to a lack of salience between ingroup and outgroup categories as participants were reminded of the group status of 
their partners and only participants with a positive affiliation towards the ingroup compared to outgroup category were 
included in this study. This suggests that in the interplay of the dual defence mechanisms of terror-management theory, the 
values that the individual holds, rather than worldview defence, was a significant moderator in the decision to cooperate 
within the single-play PD.  
     Although no significant change in cooperation was found amongst proself participants, it is important to note that 
cooperation rates of proself participants towards ingroup members fell to the unchanged low cooperation rates of proself 
participants towards outgroup members. Although the fall in cooperation towards ingroup members are in the predicted 
directions of the hypothesis, it was surprising that falls in cooperation towards the outgroup was not evident. This suggests 
that a floor-effect in the low cooperation rates by proself participants towards outgroup members may have been evident. To 
explore this idea further, greater sample sizes are required to increase the power of the testing procedure and possibly a 
different experimental game or different payoffs to those used in this study may be needed. 
     The increase in cooperation by prosocial participants towards both ingroup and outgroup members represents a new 
direction for terror-management research. Although most previous findings have concentrated on the defensive behaviours 
of mortality salience, people in their everyday lives spend a considerable amount of time maintaining their self-worth 
through a variety of good deeds towards others. To the extent that such behaviour is valued within a culture, this expression 
of being a good citizen who gives something of themselves to the collective that partially defines them may be a source of 
self-esteem. Indeed, theorists such as Adler and Rank have argued that raising children and passing values onto others, 
providing knowledge and skills through teaching, and giving to social causes, all provide a means for which people can 
transcend their fear of death (Mikulincer & Florian, 1997; Ring, 1984). This research extends these behaviours to 
cooperation, with prosocial participants increasing their cooperative behaviour towards both ingroups and outgroups 
following mortality salience. 
     In relation to the “Scrooge effect”, Dickens’s fictional character could be considered as having ‘proself’ values and, as 
such, mortality salience may not have made a real character like Scrooge more generous. The present research found that 
cooperative behaviour only increased for those people who already had a prosocial orientation. However, this research 
assumes that reminders of mortality lead to defensive motives of self-esteem enhancing behaviours and worldview defence. 
TMT thus relegates other self-preservation behaviours that could involve a reordering of value systems in a search for 
greater meaning and purpose (Mikulincer & Florian, 1997; Ring, 1984).  In this study, it is not possible to identify whether 
the observed significant increase in cooperative behaviour amongst prosocial participants was a defensive or expansive 
motive to mortality salience. It is likely that such motives are mediated by belief systems, which are outside the scope of 




     This paper has attempted to capture multifaceted human behaviour within a social dilemma, not only in terms of self-
interested behaviour but also prosocial motivations that enhance collective outcomes. Two limitations arise in this respect, 
firstly, the social dilemma used is a contrived example of real-world interdependent situations, which generally involve 
larger numbers of people, greater decision-related costs, more choices, and mixed goals of decision makers. Further studies 
should attempt to generalise across a broader range of social dilemmas that increase the validity of more interdependent 
situations. A second potential limitation of this study is that the social value orientations were assessed in a choice-based 
task, which may have induced demand characteristics and influenced people’s decisions. However, McClintock and Allison 
(1989) have demonstrated that even if social motives are assessed 4-6 weeks prior to measures of behaviour, they still affect 
behaviour in predicted ways.  
Conclusion 
 
     The results of the experiment expand on current research by emphasising that within interdependent situations mortality 
salience can impact positively on cooperative human behaviour. The increase in cooperation by prosocial participants 
towards both ingroup and outgroup members represent a new direction for terror-management research, which focuses less 
on negative defensive behaviours of prejudice and ingroup favouritism and more on positive behaviours such as 
cooperation. Within a world of spreading capitalism and finite scarce resources, in which fear of death is unlikely to abate, 
this research provides an understanding of how cooperation can increase towards all members of society.  
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Table 1.  Payoff Structure for the Prisoners Dilemma 
 Prisoner A’s Choice 
Prisoner B’s Choice Cooperate Defect 
     Cooperate  B receives 2, A receives 2 B receives 10,  A receives 0 
     Defect  B receives 0, A receive 10 B receives 7,   A receives 7 
Note. Numbers indicate years in prison. 
 
Table 2. Frequency of Decisions as a Function of Social Value Orientation and Mortality Salience 
 Cooperate Defect  
 Expected n n % Expected n n % Total 
Proself        
     Mortality Salience 15.4 14 23.0 45.6 47 77.0 61 
     Future aversive event 14.6 16 27.6 43.4 42 72.4 58 
Prosocial        
     Mortality Salience 19.4 26 70.3 17.6 11 29.7 37 
     Future aversive event 24.6 18 38.3 22.4 29 61.7 47 
 
 
